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than the rigid job situs test; and concededly, the substantial contacts
test could often produce results parallel to those of the job situs test."
Despite its favorable points, however, the substantial contacts approach
is hampered by the uncertainty of the identification and balancing of
factors in each employment relationship.' 8 Such uncertainty gives rise
to an unpredictability in the determination of the validity of proposed
union security provisions. For this reason, reliance on the job situs
standard, with its certainty of application, is more desirable, since it enables collective bargaining parties to know in advance what laws will
apply to their employment relationship.
Despite its practicality, the job situs test cannot possibly cover
every conceivable employment relationship, and even when the standard is utilized, courts may be called upon to determine which job situs
in an employment relationship is the predominant one. In some situations, courts may conclude that no job situs is so predominant as to be
the controlling factor in the determination of state right-to-work law
applications, and therefore, some reliance on a substantial contacts approach may be necessary. As long as right-to-work laws remain valid,
however, the job situs test represents the best practical solution that
recognizes the intent of the Taft-Hartley Act and the national labor
policy to deal with multistate workforce situations.
JONATHAN ADAMS BARRETT

Labor Law-J.P. Stevens: Searching for a Remedy To Fit the
Wrong
The stated purpose and policy of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA or Act)' is to prescribe the rights of employees and employers
in their interactions and to encourage the collective bargaining
process. 2 Section 7 of the NLRA3 guarantees to employees the right
67. The Supreme Court majority conceded this possibility in its criticism of the
substantial contacts approach. See 96 S. Ct. at 2147.
68. Id.

1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
2. Id. § 151.

3. Id. § 157.
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to organize themselves, to form, join or assist labor organizations, or

to refrain from such activities.

In a determined campaign to prevent

or forestall unionization of its Southern plants, the J.P. Stevens
Company has effectively negated these purposes, policies and guarantees. This campaign has involved numerous flagrant unfair labor
practices, including coercive interrogation of union adherents, 4 surveil-

lance of union organizers, 5 appeals to racial animosities, 6 threats of
plant closings, 7 and economic reprisals such as extensive discriminatory

discharges. 8 Neither fifteen adverse National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB or Board) decisions, most of which have been enforced by

circuit courts of appeals, 9 nor two contempt orders, issued by the
4. See, e.g., J.P. Stevens & Co. [Stevens l], 163 N.L.R.B. 217, 218, enforced
as modified sub nom. Textile Workers Union v. NLRB, 388 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 836 (1968).
5. See, e.g., J.P. Stevens & Co. [Stevens 1], 157 N.L.R.B. 869, 923 (1966), enforced as modified, 380 F.2d 292 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1005 (1967).
6. See Oversight Hearings on the National Labor Relations Act Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on Education and Labor,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 181 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Hearings].
7. See, e.g., J.P. Stevens & Co. [Stevens VII], 179 N.L.R.B. 254, 257-58 (1969),
enforced, 441 F.2d 514 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 830 (1971).
8. See, e.g., J.P. Stevens & Co. [Stevens 1], 157 N.L.R.B. 869 (1966), enforced
as modified, 380 F.2d 292 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1005 (1967).
9. For ease of reference, and following the pattern used by the NLRB and the
courts of appeals, these cases will be cited as follows:
Stevens I: J.P. Stevens & Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 869, 872 (1966), enforced as modified,
380 F.2d 292 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1005 (1967).
Stevens 11: J.P. Stevens & Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 217, enforced as modified sub nom.
Textile Workers Union v. NLRB, 388 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
836 (1968).
Stevens III: J.P. Stevens & Co., 167 N.L.R.B. 266 (1967), enforced as modified,
406 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir. 1968).
Stevens IV: J.P. Stevens & Co., 167 N.L.R.B. 258 (1967), enforced as modified,
406 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir. 1968).
Stevens V: J.P. Stevens & Co., 171 N.L.R.B. 1202 (1968), enforced, 417 F.2d
533 (5th Cir. 1969).
Stevens VI: Black Hawk Corp., 177 N.L.R.B. 944 (1969), enforced in part and
denied in part, 431 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1970).
Stevens VII: J.P. Stevens & Co., 179 N.L.R.B. 254 (1969), enforced, 441 F.2d
514 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 830 (1971).
Stevens VIII: J.P. Stevens & Co., 181 N.L.R.B. 666 (1970), enforced in part and
denied in part, 449 F.2d .595 (4th Cir. 1971).
Stevens IX: J.P. Stevens & Co., 183 N.L.R.B. 25 (1970), enforced, 461 F.2d 490
(4th Cir. 1972).
Stevens X: Black Hawk Corp., 183 N.L.R.B. 267 (1970).
Stevens XI: J.P. Stevens & Co., 186 N.L.R.B. 180 (1970), enforced without opinion, 455 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1971).
Stevens XII: J.P. Stevens & Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 751 (1971), remanded, 475 F.2d
973 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), modified, 205 N.L.R.B. 1032 (1973).
Stevens XIII: J.P. Stevens, 217 N.L.R.B. 513 (1975), enforced, 93 L.R.R.M.
2262 (4th Cir. 1976).
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Second 10 and Fifth" Circuits, have deterred J.P. Stevens' anti-union
animus. Not even the payment of $1.3 million in backpay awards to
approximately 300 discriminatorily discharged workers has slowed the
J.P. Stevens crusade.
The Textile Workers Union of America (TWUA) and the Indus-

trial Union Department of the AFL-CIO launched their coordinated
campaign to organize approximately twenty-five of the forty J.P.
Stevens plants in North and South Carolina in the Spring of 1963.1'
Prior to the coming of the union, plants had been operated in a permissive manner. The Company was tolerant, even lenient, in such
matters as absences, work breaks, transfers and re-hirings. 18 This
pattern was quickly changed with the advent of the union. In the
initial months of its campaign the union succeeded in enlisting a substantial number of employees, many of whom sent letters to Stevens
notifying it of their support for the TWUA. 14 Subsequently, J.P.
Stevens reprimanded and/or discharged many of these workers because of their union support; discharges followed as quickly as pretext could be found.' 5
This pattern of disregard for the dictates of the NLRA, with the
added refinements of plant closings and unlawful refusals to bargain
with NLRB recognized unions, has continued to the present. As the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Stevens VII, 1" "Stevens' intransigent recidivism is patent and overt. .

.

. [N]either passage of time

nor the admonishments of judicial tribunals have caused the Company
Stevens XIV: J.P. Stevens & Co., 219 N.L.R.B. 850, enforced, 93 L.R.R.M. 2262
(4th Cir. 1976).
Stevens XV: J.P. Stevens & Co., 220 N.L.R.B. No. 34 (1975).
10. NLRB v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 464 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
11. NLRB v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 538 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1976).
12. For a factual history of the J.P. Stevens situation, see 1976 Hearings, supra
note 6, at 178-93. Ironically, J.P. Stevens, the second largest textile manufacturer in
the South, with some 46,000 workers, was chosen as the target for this campaign because it was thought that J.P. Stevens would be more receptive to unionization than
would Burlington Industries, the largest textile manufacturer in the South. Interview
with Daniel H. Pollitt, Professor of Law, in Chapel Hill, N.C. (Jan. 7, 1977).
13. Stevens 1, 157 N.L.R.B. 869, 963-64 (1966), enforced as modified, 380 F.2d
292, 296 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1005 (1967).
14. This was done to ensure compliance with a Board requirement that in order
to prove a discriminatory discharge in violation of section 8(a) (3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)
(3) (1970), it must be shown that the employer had knowledge of the worker's union
affiliation. See generally Comment, Employer Discrimination under Section 8(a)(3),
5 U. TOL. L. REv. 722 (1974).
15. See Stevens I, 157 N.L.R.B. 869 (1966), enforced as modified, 380 F.2d 292
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1005 (1967).
16. 441 F.2d 514 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 830 (1971), enforcing 179
N.L.R.B. 254 (1969).
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to alter its now all too familiar pursuance of full-scale war against
unionization."'1 7

The economic rationale behind this "intransigent

recividism" is obvious: the Company has saved untold millions of
dollars by refusing to cooperate in collective bargaining. One estimate
has placed the value of J.P. Stevens' unlawful conduct at $18,400 per

hour.'

8

As long as violation of federal law wins financial enrichment for

the wrongdoer, there remains a continuous and open invitation to
ignore the law.

This incentive to violate the NLRA emphasizes the

need for a proper remedy for the J.P. Stevens situation.

The Board

and the courts must be especially concerned not only with the narrower
context of struggle between union and employer but also with respect

for the mandates and policies of the NLRA. 19 Neither the Board in
its remedial orders20 nor the courts in their contempt orders21 have ade-

quately confronted the need for an extraordinary remedy for the J.P.
Stevens situation. It has become clear that only an order that requires,
or holds out the promise that it may require, Stevens to pay out an
amount of money commensurate with the amount it has saved by
avoiding a collective bargaining contract 2 will serve to halt the J.P.

Stevens anti-union crusade.
BOARD REMEDIES

The National Labor Relations Board has been given broad powers
17. 441 F.2d at 521. See also the Second Circuit's contempt citation, in which
the court stated:
[R]espondents have flouted our prior decrees in many ways. In a continued
attempt to dissuade employees from joining the Textile Workers Union of
America, the company and its management personnel in various plants, despite
our prior orders, have continued to resort to such unlawful tactics as engaging
in surveillance of organizing activities, interrogating employees about their
union inclinations, threatening pro-union employees with discharge and other
reprisals, discriminatorily altering their working conditions and discharging
them because of their union sympathies. In fact, one of the employees so discharged had been illegally terminated before, was reinstated by our prior order,
but was then illegally discharged again.
NLRB v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 464 F.2d 1326, 1328-29 (2d Cir. 1972) (per curiam)
(footnote omitted).
18. 1976 Hearings,supra note 6, at 164; see 464 F.2d at 1329.
19. See SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND
LABOR, 90TH CONG., 2D SESS., NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT REMEDIES: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE (Comm. Print 1968).
20. See, e.g., Stevens 1, 157 N.L.R.B. 869 (1966), enforced as modified, 380 F.2d
292 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1005 (1967).
21. See 1976 Hearings, supra note 6, at 184. The Fifth Circuit has not yet formulated its order. NLRB v. J.P. Stevens &Co., 538 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1976).
22. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
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to remedy unfair labor practices through section 10(c) of the NLRA. -I
The Supreme Court has often expressly acknowledged that broad discretion has been vested in the Board by Congress to formulate remedies. 24 Nevertheless, the Court has imposed two significant limitations
on the Board's discretion: the sanction applied must be remedial rather
than punitive, 25 and it must be appropriate to the particular situation
before the Board.2" In Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB2 7 the Court
justified the punitive-remedial distinction as being in keeping with the
remedial tone of the Act read as a whole. -8 Consequently, the Board
cannot justify an order solely by showing that the remedy will deter
unfair labor practices.2 9 Rather, the remedy must be a reasonable attempt to compensate for the damage caused by the unfair labor practice. The second limitation is essentially a corollary of the first; a
remedy not appropriate to the particular circumstances before the
Board will be oppressive. Furthermore, an inappropriate remedy will
fail to effectuate the policies of the Act."
Within these limitations the Board may properly exercise considerable discretion. Too often, however, the NLRB resorts to preordained formulas that fail to safeguard adequately the rights guaranteed
by the Act in the precise context before the Board. 3 ' In the J.P.
Stevens cases the Board has restricted itself to the traditional framework of a cease and desist order accompanied by reinstatement with
backpay and posting of notice orders. Only within the posting requirement has the NLRB attempted to tailor a remedy to fit the precise circumstances. Recognizing that the effects of Stevens' unfair labor
practices extend beyond the plants directly involved, the Board in
23.

29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970) provides that, upon a finding that an unfair labor

practice has occurred, the Board "shall issue and cause to be served . . . an order rerequiring such person tu cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take

such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay,
as will effectuate the policies of this [Act]."
24. E.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941); International
Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72, 82 (1940).
25. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 10 (1940); Consolidated Edison
Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 235-36 (1938).
26. NLRB v. Cheney Cal. Lumber Co., 327 U.S. 385 (1946); NLRB v. Express
Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426 (1941).
27. 311 U.S. 7 (1940).

28. Id. at 10.
29. Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 658 (1961)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
30. See NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953).
31. See Note, The Need for Creative Orders Under Section 10(c) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 69 (1963).
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Stevens 112 and IP directed that the notice be mailed to each employee
of the Stevens plants in North and South Carolina and copies posted
at all such plants. The NLRB further ordered that the notice be read
to all employees, convened during working time, by a Company
spokesman. 4
In Stevens XI1" the NLRB found that Stevens, in violation of
section 8(a)(4)1" of the NLRA, had discriminated against two workers
for having testified on behalf of the union at a hearing. The Board's
remedy consisted only of an order to cease and desist and to post compliance notices at the plant where the violations occurred. Acting upon
the TWUA's petition for review of the NLRB order, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit remanded the case to the
Board for consideration of a more stringent remedial order.3 7 In response, the Board granted only the Union's request that additional
material be added to the notice and directed that it be posted at all of
J.P. Stevens' plants in North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia.3 8
The ineffectiveness of such orders is amply demonstrated by the
continuing stream of unfair labor practice charges involving J.P.
Stevens that have been brought before the NLRB. Currently, ninetyfour such charges are pending.30 There is no question that the Board
can and should take J.P. Stevens' history of recalcitrance into account
in designing its remedy. 0 The Board's challenge, then, is to construct a
sanction severe enough to deter Stevens' anti-union campaign while
complying with the punitive-remedial distinction imposed by the Supreme Court."
Although under Supreme Court standards, deter32. 157 N.L.R.B. 869 (1966), enforced as modified, 380 F.2d 292 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1005 (1967).
33.

163 N.L.R.B. 217, enforced as modified sub nom. Textile Workers Union v.

NLRB, 388 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 836 (1968).
34. This part of the order was later modified by the court of appeals to allow
Stevens the option of having a Board representative read the notice. Stevens I, 380
F.2d at 304-05; Stevens 11, 388 F.2d at 903-04.
35. 190 N.L.R.B. 751 (1971), remanded, 475 F.2d 973 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam),
modified, 205 N.L.R.B. 1032 (1973).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (4) (1970).
37. 475 F.2d 973 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
38. 205 N.L.R.B. 1032 (1973).
39. See Oversight Hearings on the National Labor Relations Board before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on Education and Labor,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 128 (1975) (testimony of NLRB Chairman Betty Murphy). It
should be noted that these 94 charges all involve discriminatory discharges and, hence,
may not constitute a complete list of J.P. Stevens cases pending before the NLRB.
40. Cf. NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258 (1969) (cost of Board
delay properly borne by wrongdoing employer).
41. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
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rence in itself is not sufficient to justify a Board order it is certainly
42
desirable that a properly remedial order have that effect.
The net effect of fourteen years of unfair labor practices by J.P.
Stevens has been to deny Stevens' employees their section 743 guaranteed rights to organize and bargain collectively. 44 Effective redress for
this ultimate violation of section 8(a)(1) 4" should both compensate the
party wronged and withhold from the wrongdoer the fruits of its violation.40 Only the unique remedy of monetary compensation for loss
of section 7 rights will serve directly to accomplish both these ends.
While employees choose to be represented by a union for a variety
of reasons, it is axiomatic that the principal reason is economic. Employees want the opportunity to bargain collectively through a union
because invariably there is a significant and direct monetary gain to
them as a result of the first collective bargaining contract. 47 Thus,
the economic value of the right to organize is the monetary gain that
the employee may reasonably expect to obtain if the employer cooperates in the collective bargaining process. A compensatory remedy
would direct Stevens to make its employees whole for the lost wages.
Correspondingly, the economic benefit to the employer may be
measured by the increased wages not paid to its employees. 48 A related benefit to J.P. Stevens lies in the weakened support of the TWUA
by Stevens' employees. As a result of Stevens' flagrant unfair labor
42. Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 659 (1961)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
44. In light of this pattern of unfair labor practices it seems doubtful that Stevens'
employees can freely exercise their right to organize. See Pollitt, NLRB Re-Run Elections: A Study, 41 N.C.L. REv. 209 (1963). This study of 20,153 elections (of which
267 were re-runs) held between 1960 and 1962 shows that in over two-thirds of the
cases in which re-run elections were held the party who caused the election to be set
aside by its unfair practices won the re-run election. See id. at 212. Further, certain
unfair labor practices are more effective than others in destroying election conditions.
Threats of economic reprisals are clearly the most effective. See id. at 216. Finally,
time appears to be a major factor. The study shows that if the re-run is held within
thirty days of the election or more than nine months after, the chances of a different
result are only one in five. Id. at 221. Thus, it appears unlikely in the J.P. Stevens
situation that the union can expect an untainted election in the near future.
45. 29, U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice
for an employer-(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title."
46. See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 889, 894 (6th Cir. 1965).
47. See Ross, Analysis of Administrative Process Under Taft-Hartley, in 1966
LABOR RELATONS YEARBOOK 299, 306; Schlossberg & Silard, The Need for a Compensatory Remedy in Refusal-to-Bargain Cases, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 1059, 1082-85 (1968).
48. The average pay of textile workers, excluding overtime pay, is $3.38 per hour,
as compared to an average of $4.84 for all manufacturing production workers.
1976 Hearings,supra note 6, at 153.
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practices, the union has proven itself too weak to bargain effectively
when it has reached the bargaining table.4" A final benefit inuring
to Stevens lies in its improved competitive position in the marketplace
as a result of its artificially low labor costs.50 This last benefit should

be of special concern to the NLRB in that it would seem to act as a
continuous inducement for other employers, particularly other textile
manufacturers, to violate flagrantly the NLRA. Thus, an order
designed to make Stevens employees economically whole for the denial
of their guaranteed right to organize is appropriate. 51

In the context of J.P. Stevens' massive violations of section
8(a)(1), a make whole order cannot be classified as punitive. Employees would not be enriched by such a remedy; rather, they would

merely be afforded monetary compensation equivalent to the loss sustained.

Arguably, an order directing Stevens to make its employees

whole for lost wages is less than fully compensatory in that it fails to
account for the intangible benefits of a collective bargaining contract

such as dignity and job security. 52 Nor can this make whole remedy
be dismissed as speculative.

"

The rule barring recovery of uncertain

damages does not preclude the recovery of damages that are definitely
attributable to the wrong and only uncertain as to their amount. 54 When
the nature of the wrongful act itself precludes the ascertainment of the
49. The TWUA won an election at the J.P. Stevens plant in Roanoke Rapids,
North Carolina on August 28, 1974. No contract has resulted, however. Rather, the
union has filed refusal to bargain charges with the NLRB, under § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(5) (1970). Id. at 191-92.
50. See note 48 supra.
51. The economic value of the right to organize is borne out by a recent study
that found that a collective bargaining contract resulted in 86% of the cases in which
the union was recognized by the employer as required by law. Ross, supra note 47,
at 306. It should be noted that the appropriateness of this remedy is not undermined
by recognition of the fact that section 7 also guarantees the right to refrain from selforganization. The reasonable expectation of monetary gain from the collective bargaining process is not dependent upon whether an employee supports the union or not.
Rather, that expectation is a constant, an objective factor that must be weighed by the
fully informed employee in deciding whether he wants union representation. In this
context, the economic value of the right foregone is equal to that of the right exercised.
52. In theory, a make whole remedy is less oppressive than the common reinstatement with backpay remedy for discriminatory discharge cases. There the employer must
in essence pay twice for the same work-once to the discharged worker and once to
the worker hired to replace him. See Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107 (1970), enforcement denied sub norn. UAW v. NLRB, 449 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (per
curiam).
53. For a discussion of the mechanics of determining the amount of compensation,
see Note, Monetary Compensation as a Remedy for Employer Refusal to Bargain, 56
GEo. L.J. 474, 497-504 (1968).
54. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946); Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931).
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amount of damages with certainty, the wrongdoer must bear the risk
of the uncertainty that he has created. 51 Without question the Board
is empowered to order relief that merely approximates the conditions
that would have prevailed in the absence of an unfair labor practice."
The Board's decision in Ex-Cell-O Corp.17 raises a more significant objection. In that case the NLRB denied a union's request for
a make whole remedy on the ground that such an order would constitute a compelled agreement in violation of section 8(d) of the
NLRA. 58 Ex-Cell-O Corp., however, involved a section 8(a)(5) unlawful refusal to bargain. 9 In that context, the make whole remedy
operates as a direct, though retroactive, intervention in the bargaining
process. In contrast, the J.P. Stevens make whole order would be designed to remedy violations of section 8(a)(1). °° Presumed contracts benefits, in the form of lost wages, merely serve, in the section
8(a)(1) context, as a device to measure the injuries sustained by
Stevens employees. The Board would not be interfering in any ongoing bargaining process. Thus, the J.P. Stevens make whole order
cannot be characterized as a compelled agreement, "any more than a
statutory treble damage action under the antitrust laws becomes a 'contract' action" merely because the plaintiff's damages "are measured in
part by the estimated more favorable contract terms [he] would
6
have secured but for the unlawful conspiracy." '
As an alternative to this section 7 make whole remedy, the NLRB
might direct J.P. Stevens to bargain with the TWUA, despite the union's failure to win a representation election. The Supreme Court, in
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,6 2 specifically authorized such a bargaining order. Balancing the sometimes conflicting goals of deterring employer misbehavior and effectuating employee free choice, the
Court found that two circumstances justify the bargaining order remedy. First, even when a union has never demonstrated majority support
55. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. at 265.
56. See NLRB v. Mooney Aircraft Inc., 375 F.2d 402 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 859 (1967); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. NLRB, 121 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1941).
57. 185 N.L.R.B. 107 (1970), enforcement denied sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 449
F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (Supp. V 1975) prohibits the Board from compelling either
party to agree to a proposal or make a concession. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB,
397 U.S. 99 (1970).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1970).
60. Id. § 158(a)(1).
61. St. Antoine, A Touchstone for Labor Board Remedies, 14 WAYNe L. REv.
1039, 1053 (1968).
62. 395 U.S.575 (1969).
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in an appropriate unit, the Board may issue a bargaining order when
the employer's unfair labor practices are so "outrageous" and "pervasive" that their "'coercive' effects cannot be eliminated by the
application of traditional remedies, with the result that a fair and reliable election cannot be had."6 Second, when the employer's unfair
labor practices are less pervasive, the Board may issue a bargaining
order upon a finding, not only that a fair election is improbable, but
also that at one point the union had majority support."4 The rationale
behind the Court's decision is clear: if the Board could enter only a
cease and desist order and direct an election or a rerun, it would in
effect be rewarding the employer and allowing him to profit from his
wrongful acts, while at the same time severely curtailing the employees'
right freely to determine whether they desire union representation. 65
The Board, however, has traditionally been reluctant to issue a bargaining order without a finding that the union at one time had majority
support.06
The NLRB has issued a bargaining order in only one of its fifteen
Stevens decisions. 7 In enforcing that order, the court of appeals held
that, though the Board had carefully based its order upon a finding of
majority status, a bargaining order would have been appropriate even if
the Union had never possessed majority support.s This holding lends
considerable support to the proposition that the Stevens situation fits
well within the first set of circumstances that the Supreme Court found
to justify a bargaining order and, consequently, it should be unnecessary for the Union to prove it once had majority support. The efficacy
of a bargaining order in the J.P. Stevens context, however, remains
open to question. In theory, the bargaining order deters interference
with employees' rights to organize by making such unfair labor practices
unprofitable. That deterrent force is completely undercut when the
employer is willing, as J.P. Stevens obviously is,0 9 to continue its unfair
63. Id. at 613-14 (quoting NLRB v. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562, 570 (4th
Cir. 1967)).
64. Id. at 614-15.
65. See Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1943).
66. See, e.g., Stevens 1, 157 N.L.R.B. 869, 877 (1966), enforced as modified, 380
F.2d 292 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1005 (1967); Stevens VII, 179 N.L.R.B.

254, 254 n.2 (1969), enforced, 441 F.2d 5'14 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 830
(1971).
67. Stevens VII, 179 N.L.R.B. 254 (1969), enforced, 441 F.2d 514 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 830 (1971).
68. 441 F.2d at 522.
69. J.P. Stevens' reaction to the bargaining order in Stevens VII was to refuse
to bargain in good faith. Finally, in 1975, Stevens closed down the plant involved,
allegedly for economic reasons. 1976 Hearings,supra note 6, at 187-88.
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labor practices by refusing to bargain in good faith. Experience has
indicated that the Board is unable to devise an adequate remedy for
section 8(a)(5) refusals to bargain."
The same practical considerations militate against an order directing the employer to negotiate contract benefits retroactively to the
time the bargaining would have occurred if the employer had accepted
its statutory responsibility. 7 Given J.P. Stevens' history of antiunionism, it seems likely that such an order would only reinforce
Stevens' intransigence. Therefore, it appears that only the section 7
make whole remedy will serve to deter Stevens' unfair labor practices
and to compensate its employees. While both the bargaining order
and the retroactive bargaining order hold out the promise of deterrence
and compensation, in practice it appears that neither are adequate to
counter J.P. Stevens' "intransigent recidivism."
CONTEMPT REMEDIES

Section 10(e) of the NLRA12 provides that the Board may petition the federal courts of appeals for enforcement of its orders. As
the Supreme Court has recognized, 73 this section contemplates that a
future contempt proceeding may be necessary either to ensure compliance with or punish disregard for the court-enforced order. The
contempt power is particularly well suited for cases of repeated flagrant
violators of the NLRA such as J.P. Stevens. Unrestricted by statutory
limitations, a court's power to design contempt sanctions to fit the cir7
cumstances of the case before it is almost completely discretionary. "
In most cases the civil contempt power, as opposed to the
criminal contempt power, 75 is more suitable to the labor law con70. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 109 (1970).
& Silard, supra note 47, at 1059.
71.

See also Schlossberg

See A Survey of Labor Remedies, 54 U. VA. L. REV. 38, 52 (1968).

72. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970).
73. See NLRB v. Warren Co., 350 U.S. 107 (1955).
74. See Lance v. Plummer, 353 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
929 (1966) (auxiliary deputy deprived of badge). See generally Dobbs, Contempt of
Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 267-82 (1971).
75. In contrast to civil contempt cases, use of the criminal contempt power brings
into play the constitutional safeguards of the criminal process. In the context of a
labor law violation, two of these safeguards are problematical. The criminal process
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, a standard of proof that might cause many
violations to go unpunished given the abundant possibilities for inventing legitimate
sounding excuses for many unfair labor practices. Further, the court may not order
imprisonment of more than six months without affording the contemnor the right to
a jury trial-and juries have often reached questionable results in the controversial atmosphere of labor trials. See Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representa-
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text. 70 A civil contempt order may be coercive, compensatory or both,
while, in contrast, the purpose of a criminal contempt proceeding is to
vindicate the court's authority. 77 The Second Circuit's 1972 civil contempt order against Stevens, 78 however, failed to accomplish either end.
In its order, the Second Circuit, rather than directing a monetary
penalty, attempted to protect the union's organizational activities by
affording the union "similar facilities" to respond to the Stevens' antiunion representations. 79 The order has failed to deter Stevens' anti-union
campaign; in 1973 the NLRB filed a second petition for adjudication in
civil contempt with the Second Circuit." A third petition was filed in
1976.81

A more viable alternative to the Second Circuit's approach is suggested by the Fifth Circuit's recent contempt orders in NLRB v. Schill
Steel Products Inc.8 2 and NLRB v. Johnson Manufacturing Co.83 In
Schill Steel Products, the court found that the company had arbitrarily
refused to sign an agreed-upon contract in violation of an earlier court
order to bargain in good faith.84 In its purgative order the court directed the company, in addition to executing the contract, to make its
employees whole for all wages and benefits lost as a result of the company's refusal to sign the agreement.85 In Johnson Manufacturing Co.
the Fifth Circuit held the company in contempt of an earlier contempt
order to bargain in good faith.8 6 In its contempt order, the court
fashioned a make whole remedy for the union, directing the company
to reimburse the union for its expenses incurred by reason of the company's failure to comply with the first contempt order.87
tion Elections under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REv. 38, 125-26
(1964).

76. The most significant limitation on the civil contempt power as a tool in enforcing the NLRA is the Board's traditional reluctance to petition for adjudications in
contempt. During fiscal 1975, only 30 petitions for adjudication in contempt for noncompliance with decrees enforcing Board orders were filed, 29 seeking civil contempt
relief and 1 seeking criminal sanctions. 40 NLRB ANN. REP. 172 (1975).
77. See Dobbs, supra note 74, at 235-49.
78.

NLRB v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 464 F.2d 1326, 1348 (2d Cir. 1972).

79. See 1976 Hearings, supra note 6, at 184. The Fifth Circuit has not yet issued
its contempt order.
80. Id. at 169-70.
81. Id.
82. 480 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1973).
83. 511 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1975).

84. 480 F.2d at 592-93.
85.

Id. at 598.

86. 511 F.2d at 154. The earlier order is reported in NLRB v. Johnson Mfg.
Co., 458 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1972).
87. 511 F.2d at 1.57.
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Given the particular circumstances of the J.P. Stevens situation,
it apparently is within the court's contempt power to construct a remedy
designed to make Stevens employees whole for the losses sustained as
a result of Stevens' flagrant unfair labor practices. 88 The chief advantage of such an order is its effect of removing the profit factor from
the past contemptuous violations of court-enforced NLRB orders.8"
The contempt stage is crucial to the statutory scheme for preventing
unfair labor practices; it is incumbent upon the courts to design contempt orders that, in the precise context of the cases before the court,
will deter violations of the NLRA.
CONCLUSION

J.P. Stevens, by its adamant refusal to recognize its employees'

rights to self-organization, has challenged the integrity of the NLRA.
In Stevens 11," Trial Examiner Boyd Leedom, a former Chairman
of the NLRB, suggested that it may be impossible within the framework of the NLRA to devise a remedy that will right the wrongs of
an employer who persists in violations in the manner that Stevens has
persisted. Such defeatism belies the considerable discretion vested in
the Board's remedial powers and the court's contempt powers. As
Justice Whittaker noted in Local 60 v. NLRB, 1 "It is certain that
Congress did not intend by the Act 'to hold out to [employees] an
illusory right for which it was denying them a remedy.' ,,92
ALAN

E. KRAUS

88. See text accompanying notes 47-52 supra.
89. In contrast, the coercive fine is purely prospective. Its intent is merely to
forestall future violations. Although a coercive fine might serve as a valuable adjunct
to a make whole order, such a fine alone would allow Stevens to retain a handsome
profit from its past violations.
90. 167 N.L.R.B. 266, 303 (1967), enforced as modified, 406 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir.
1968).
91. Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651 (1961).
92. Id. at 662 (Whittaker, J., dissenting) (quoting Graham v. Brotherhood of Firemen, 338 U.S. 232, 240 (1949)) (brackets in original).

